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Abstract
Mainstream economic theory is hardly capable to explain some of the
stylised facts that are normally observed in actual financial time series.
Rather, phenomena like volatility clustering and excess comovement of
prices have been successfully investigated in frameworks featuring het-
erogeneous agents and bounded rationality. Our model inherits some
of the assumptions common to the Heterogeneous Agents stream of
research, and develops an Agent-Based numerical simulation able to
study the whole transitional price dynamics of the risky security, and
the evolution of portfolio choices and wealth distribution among the
traders. Adopting this methodology, we are able to show the emer-
gence of transient bubble-and-bust dynamics, intended as sharp decou-
pling of the asset price from underlying fundamentals, and to replicate
recent findings in financial literature about the asymptotic wealth dom-
inance of the least-risk-averse trader, under quite general assumptions.
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1 Introduction
During the late 2000s financial crisis and the triggered Great Recession,
an increasing number of people, both households and officials, felt puz-
zled and disappointed as no economist (with negligible exceptions, notably
Roubini, 2006; Schiff andDownes, 2007) has been able to predict such catas-
trophe. Prevailing theoretical approach, still in use today and largely reliant
on Dynamic-Stochastic General-Equilibrium (hereafter DSGE) methodol-
ogy, is then put under pressure and regarded with growing scepticism. Its
building blocks, related to the assumptions of efficient market, representa-
tive agent, and rational expectations, are progressively showing their inade-
quacy in explaining the economic dynamics of a day-by-day more complex
and interconnected world. As a consequence their counterparts, namely
market frictions, heterogeneity, and bounded rationality, are slowly (re-)gaining
popularity in current research. Nevertheless, in a much more subtle way,
these ideas have constituted the core of a largely neglected literature dur-
ing the last couple of decades. In particular, the interaction of boundedly
rational heterogeneous agents in economics is, to a large extent, analysed
by means of two distinct but partially overlapping strands of methodology:
Heterogeneous Agent Models (hereafter HAMs), and Agent-Based Models
(hereafter ABMs). The first class, thoroughly surveyed by Hommes (2006),
uses mathematical tools to derive strict analytical investigation of the dy-
namical systems driving the laws of motion of the economy. These models
are indeed useful in studying the dynamics and stability properties of an
economy where agents take decisions by means of heuristics or relatively
simple rules of thumb. The second class, belonging to the broader area of
computational economics, relies on extensive computer simulation in order
to grasp the emergence of implicit phenomena arising from the interaction
among a multitude of agents. Moreover, ABMs prove crucially useful in
studying the evolution of objective variables when HAMs’ dynamical sys-
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tems become intractable or analytic solutions are unobtainable. Relevant lit-
erature, to which this paper is intended a contribution, is broadly surveyed
in Tesfatsion and Judd (2006), and specifically, regarding financial appli-
cations, by LeBaron (2006). We present a generic Walrasian asset-pricing
model, similar to that derived in Anufriev et al. (2006), and we reproduce
its relevant results in an Agent-Based computational framework. We con-
sider a pure exchange economy with one risky assets and a riskless bond,
where heterogeneous adaptive traders take investment decisions accord-
ing to forecasts of future returns, based on past market observables, with
constant relative risk averse (CRRA) andmean-variance attitude. Adopting
this methodology makes us able to relax some of the constraint imposed in
Anufriev et al. (2012), such as the assumption of procedurally rational equi-
librium; this allows to account for thewhole out-of-equilibrium transitional
dynamics of the system, and not just the point it asymptotically converges
to. We show such dynamics can turn out astoundingly rich, even under
quite general assumptions and reasonable parameters value.
Next Section briefly reviews the current mainstream approach to finan-
cial markets theory and lists its common assumptions; Section 3 surveys
some of the empirical stylised that actual financial time series usually ex-
hibit; in response to such puzzling evidence, Section 4 presents a recent and
promising methodological approach; then, Section 5 sketches the model
fromwhichwe develop, in Section 6, the Agent-Based numerical setup and
discuss the associated findings; finally, Section 7 concludes and suggests
further conceivable improvements.
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2 The incumbent interpretative legacy and its
basic assumptions
As Colander et al. (2009) recognize, the last global financial crisis has re-
vealed the need to fundamentally rethink the way financial systems work
and related research is carried out. The implicit view behind standardmod-
els is that markets and economies are inherently stable and that they get
off-track only temporarily. The majority of economists thus failed to warn
policy-makers about the threatening systemic crisis and ignored the work
of those who did. “The confinement of macroeconomics to models of stable states
that are perturbed by limited external shocks and that neglect the intrinsic recur-
rent boom-and-bust dynamics of our economic system is remarkable” (see again
Colander et al., 2009). After all, worldwide financial and economic crises
are hardly new and have had a tremendous impact beyond the immediate
economic consequences of mass unemployment and hyper-inflation.
Before economists faced the current crisis, there was a general consen-
sus over the fundamental mechanisms of macroeconomics and over Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium models as a good representation of
the macroeconomy. These models reportedly originated in the 1970s as the
necessity for macroeconomic models to incorporate proper microeconomic
foundation came into surface, especially after the recognition of large-scale
macroeconometric forecasting models being vulnerable to the Lucas cri-
tique (Lucas Jr., 1976). DSGEmodels attempt to explain aggregate economic
phenomena, such as economic growth, business cycles, and the effects of
monetary and fiscal policy, on the basis of macroeconomic models derived
frommicroeconomic principles. Despite the shareable good intention, such
microfoundation has been basically translated into a number of highly ques-
tionable assumptions, still regarded as normal practice nowadays. The fol-
lowing subsections are devoted to briefly address these constructs.
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2.1 Complete markets
A complete (system of) market(s) is one in which there exists a market, and
therefore a price, for every good, the latter intended as a state-of-nature-
specific concept, and shows a 2-dimensional (time and space) collocation in
the commodity space (e.g. an umbrella tomorrow if it rains is a distinct com-
modity with respect to an umbrella tomorrow if there is clear sky). A state
is, in turns, defined as a complete specification of the values of all relevant
variables over the entire relevant time horizon (see e.g. Flood, 1991). Finan-
cially speaking, a market is complete if and only if the number of attainable
Arrow pure securities equals (spans) the number (space) of possible states-
of-nature; put differently, market completeness ensures the possibility of
arranging a portfolio with any conceivable payoff vector, allowing optimal
risk allocation among the traders (a necessary condition for the First Wel-
fare Theorem to hold). This argument is usually put forth to justify financial
innovation and the diffusion of derivatives. However, evidence suggests fi-
nancial markets are light-years away from being complete (see e.g. Buiter,
2009 and again Flood, 1991), and likely they will never be, as i) time can be
in principle infinitely divided, thus implying an infinite number ofmarkets;
ii) any possible occurrence (e.g. any future invention or innovation) and its
timing must be evaluated and taken into account; iii) transaction cost must
be null.
2.2 Rational behaviour and rational expectations
Individual rationality is usually embedded by means of two separated as-
sumptions (see Sargent, 1993): agents are generally believed to be both
(unboundedly) rational in taking decisions, thus bearing no difficulties in
computationally maximising an intertemporal utility (or profit) function
(so that their choice is always the most efficient), and in forming expec-
tations about future occurrences, so that their forecasts systematically coin-
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cide with the mathematical expectation of the true model of the economy,
given the known probability distribution of all the variables involved; it fol-
lows that the expectation will always equal the actual outcome, but for an
orthogonal forecast error that is pure white noise1. For this to be possible, the
assumption of complete and clearing markets must be satisfied, otherwise
the agent can’t make a rational forecast of future income, even in the case of
finite time span, as he needs to know the probability distribution of future
payments, in turns depending on asset prices in that period, which most
likely will depend on the next period price of this and other assets, which
will in turns depend on the prices twoperiods ahead, etc. Since its introduc-
tion in the sixties byMuth (1961) and its popularization in economics by Lu-
cas Jr. (1971), the rational expectations hypothesis has become the dominat-
ing expectations formation paradigm in economics. Nevertheless, in such
a computational demanding framework, as Arthur (2006) remarks, DSGE
models are populated by agents that solve, in essence, a static optimisation
problem, while real-life dynamics that oblige agents to reconsider at each
step their decisions are absent. Strictly speaking, rational expectations pro-
vides an elegant and parsimonious way to exclude ad hoc forecasting rules
and market psychology from economic modelling.
2.3 Representative agent
Technically, an economic model is said to have a representative agent if all
agents of the same type are identical. Deirdre McCloskey claims (as Colan-
der et al., 2009 report) “it became a rule in the conversation of some economists
because Tom and Bob said so” and turns to be widespread adopted under the
name of Robinson Crusoe economy in spite of the results coming from the
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Debreu, 1974; Mantel, 1976; Son-
1For a recent (and remarkable) discussion on the use of conditional expectations and the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic unpredictability refer to Hendry and Mizon
(2014)
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nenschein, 1972), showing that the excess-demand function for an econ-
omy is not restricted by the usual regularity restrictions on individual pref-
erences. Put simply, this basically means one cannot say anything useful
about aggregate demand functions, even when they are built upon well-
behaving and rational individuals. In this respect, DSGE modellers cav-
alierly neglect this result and continue to assume that aggregation can be
performed without loss of generality. Unfortunately, with that, also all macro
issues that follow from agent heterogeneity and from an unequal income
distribution are swept under the table.
2.4 Efficient markets
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (hereafter EMH), formalized by Fama
(1970), asserts that, at any point in time, asset prices are determined by
fundamental variables (such as the present value of future dividends) and
“fully reflect all available information”, i.e. correctly reveal assets’ true value,
based on both current economic conditions and the best estimate of how
those conditions will evolve in the future. This is possible only if the arrival
of new information (e.g. about the underlying fundamental variables) is
entirely unpredictable, i.e. it comes as a series of random shock with zero
mean. Under this perspective, dubbed randomwalk hypothesis after Bachelier
(1900), it is impossible to make above-average returns by trading in stock
markets, except through persistent luck or by obtaining inside informa-
tion. The idea runs as follows: were the markets not efficient, there would
be profit opportunities that would then be exploited by rational arbitrage
traders. Rational traders would buy (sell) an underpriced (overpriced) as-
set, thus driving its price back to the correct, fundamental value. Allegedly,
in an efficientmarket, there can be no forecastable structure in asset returns,
since any such structure would be exploited by rational arbitrageurs and
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would therefore disappear. Accordingly, three versions of the EMH are
sketched:
 in its weak form, the EMH says no abnormal profit can be reaped by
analysing the information embedded into previous prices; put differ-
ently, no amount of time series analysis can generate a successful in-
vestment strategy.
 in its semi-strong form, stock prices immediately adjust to absorb new
information, and no investor can benefit over and above the market by
trading on new information.
 in its strong form, all information, either public and private, is accounted
for in stock prices, so that even inside information cannot give any
advantage to any investor.
Fama identifies three sufficient conditions for a market to be efficient, in
the above sense: the absence of any transaction cost in trading securities;
the costless availability of all information to any market participant; the
unanimous agreement on the implications of current information for cur-
rent and future price distributions of any security. A further investigation
on the extent to which EMH related assumptions are empirically validated
is postponed to the next Section.
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3 Relevant stylized facts in financial time series
From the empirical point of view, none of the above assumptions is really
validated. Actual financial time series often exhibit challenging statistical
properties, many of which still cannot be properly explained by incumbent
theory (see Cont, 2001). The following subsections sketch a brief outline of
these findings.
3.1 Volatility clustering
Volatility displays auto-correlation over time, capturing the fact that high
volatility events tend to cluster together, resulting in persistence of the am-
plitudes of price changes. Mandelbrot (1963) recognizes that “large changes
tend to be followed by large changes, of either sign, and small changes tend to be fol-
lowed by small changes”. While the linear auto-correlation function of price
changes tends to rapidly decay in a fewminutes, especially in high-liquidity
markets (this being often cited as supporting the EMH, see Fama, 1991), it is
not enough to imply the independence of the increments; auto-correlation
is significantly present in nonlinear functions, such as the absolute value or
the square of returns (Ding et al., 1993), undermining a key assumption of
the random-walk model.
3.2 Excess volatility
The variability of asset prices is usually not justifiable by variation in related
economic fundamentals. The occurrence of large returns (in absolute value)
is unexplainable by new information coming available. Cutler et al. (1989)
remark the difficulty of explaining as much as half of the variance in stock
prices on the basis of publicly available news bearing on fundamental val-
ues; a clear example is the sharp drop in stock prices occurred on October
19th, 1987 in the complete absence of news about fundamentals. Another
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striking empirical observation has been the strong appreciation followed by
a strong depreciation of the dollar in the mid eighties, which seemed to be
unrelated to economic fundamentals (see Frankel and Froot, 1986). More-
over volatility has been showed to systematically exceed that justifiable by
fundamentals (see Shiller, 1981, 1989 and LeRoy and Porter, 1981).
3.3 Excess covariance
Classical finance models share the prediction that stock prices shall move
together only in response to common variations in fundamentals. However
this is not always the case. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) show that stock
returns of companies in unrelated businesses co-move significantly more
that can be explained by common variations in discount rates. On the other
hand, Froot and Dabora (1999) find that returns of siamese-twin companies,
whose cash-flows are perfectly correlated, lay far from perfectly co-moving.
Additional results show that covariance and correlation across asset returns
change over time and according to the business cycle, with average corre-
lation being higher during bad times (see Ribeiro and Veronesi, 2002).
3.4 Heavy tails
Distribution of returns tends to show significant leptokurtosis (see Guil-
laume et al., 1997 and again Mandelbrot, 1963 and Ding et al., 1993), likely
displaying a power-law or Pareto-like tail (Cont, 2001). This finding is,
alone, able to cast doubts on the validity of classical portfolio theory, the
Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model (see Black and Scholes, 1973
and Merton, 1973) or the RiskMetrics™ variance-covariance approach to
Value at Risk, all relying on normality assumption of returns.
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3.5 Financial bubbles: a neglected stylized fact
While the aforementioned phenomena have been largely investigated by
economic literature, financial bubbles are not generally included among the
financial time series stylized facts, and little effort has been put in studying
their formation. It is not necessary to go far back in the past to encounter sit-
uations in which financial markets had experienced, either locally or glob-
ally, periods of severe turmoil. Themost recent episode, whose long-lasting
effects are still ongoing, reportedly originated as a subprimemortgage crisis
in the US in 2007, in turns triggered by the burst of an housing bubble that
peaked in 2005-2006. A decade before, another major distress struck the
Nasdaq composite index, dubbed the Dot-com bubble: in the period, rang-
ing from 1997 to 2000, internet-related public companies saw their stock
prices astronomically soar, although most of them were experiencing sus-
tained net loss. Then, roughly in March 2000, correction started, making a
number of these companies to go bankrupt, and most of survivors’ market
value to plummet as much as 90%. Quoting Stiglitz (1990), “if the reason that
the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling price will be
high tomorrow — when ‘fundamental’ factors do not seem to justify such a price
— then a bubble exists”. Clearly, the existence of such bubbles stands quite
at odds with the EMH asserting that all the price swings continuously ob-
servable in financial markets are the mere instantaneous and unbiased ad-
justments towards the equilibrium, triggered by new public available infor-
mation or, put differently, to changing fundamentals. With respect to the
Dot-com bubble, according to the EMH the Nasdaq was correctly priced
1,140 in March 1996, also correctly priced 5,048 in March 2000, and again
correctly priced when, in October 2002, it had returned to 1,140 (see also
Cooper, 2008). The pervasive presence of leptokurtosis then challenges the
EMH prescription about the impossibility of abnormal capital gains. To
sum up, mainstream economists believe the sources of market instability
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have to necessarily be external to the market, and come as exogenous un-
predictable shocks. Occurrences such as financial bubbles are then conve-
niently believed to be the exception, rather than the rule, irrespectively of
their devastating consequences. On the very opposite side, as a leading
example of a strand of literature including Kindleberger (1978) and Fisher
(1933), Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (see Minsky, 1992) argues
that in the money-manager capitalismwe live in, financial markets are intrin-
sically fragile, and bubbles can be explained on an endogenous ground.
The astounding idea that “stability is destabilising” or, put differently, that
success breads excess that leads to crisis, captures the tendency by bor-
rowers and lenders in periods of tranquility to become increasingly reckless
and financial innovation to advance. As opposed to the lasseiz-fair school,
Minsky suggests an extensive use of government regulation (Big Govern-
ment) to prevent financial bubbles, including a strong Central Bank acting
as lender-of-last-resort (Minsky, 1986). Together with valuable attempts to
model such endogeneity in fully-fledged evolving economies (see e.g. Delli
Gatti et al., 2007; Dosi et al., 2014), it seems nonetheless worthwhile to in-
vestigate the conditions prompting an endogenous bubble-and-bust cycle
to emerge through the sheer interaction of heterogeneous traders. This con-
stitutes the core objective of this paper.
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4 A new paradigm: heterogeneity, and bounded
rationality
In aworldwhere all agents are rational and it is common knowledge that all
agents are rational, trade will not take place. No trader can reap any advan-
tage from superior private information because other rational traders antic-
ipate that he must have positive information about an asset and will there-
fore not sell the asset to him. Several no trade theorems have been obtained
(see e.g. Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) that are in sharp contrast with the high
daily trading volume observed in real financial markets, such as the stock
market and the foreign exchange market. This tremendous trading volume
reinforces the idea of heterogeneous expectations and that it takes differ-
ences of opinion among market participants for trade to take place. The
introduction of agent heterogeneity in economic modelling usually paral-
lels the adoption of boundedly rational behaviour. Although the latter started
gaining popularity since 1990s, antecedents date back decades before. Si-
mon (1957) emphasized that individuals are limited in their knowledge
about their environment and in their computing abilities, and moreover
that they face search costs to obtain sophisticated information in order to
pursue optimal decision rules. Simon argued that, because of these lim-
itations, bounded rationality with agents using simple but reasonable or
satisfying rules of thumb for their decisions under uncertainty, is a more
accurate and more realistic description of human behaviour than perfect
rationality with fully optimal decision rules. In the 70s this view was sup-
ported by evidence from psychology laboratory experiments of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), showing that in simple decision problems under un-
certainty humans do not behave rationally, in the sense of maximizing ex-
pected utility; rather, their behaviour can be described by simple heuristics
which may lead to significant biases. In an heterogeneous framework the
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presence of a fully rational agent requires his perfect knowledge about the
beliefs of all other non-rational agents, which looks rather unrealistic, as
emphasized by Arthur (1995). A boundedly rational agent forms expec-
tations based upon observable quantities and adapts his forecasting rule as
additional observations become available. Nevertheless, adaptive learning
may well converge to a rational expectations equilibrium. A critique usu-
ally put forth to behavioural economics and bounded rationality, as rec-
ognized by Hommes (2006), is that it leaves “many degrees of freedom”:
any such model must provide a plausible story that there is at least some
reasonable consistency between beliefs and realizations, and how agents
select from a large class of possible forecasting and trading strategies. One
fascinating theory is the evolutionary approach put forth by Nelson andWin-
ter (1982), where agents (or firms) select from a class of simple behavioural
strategies according to their relative performance, measured e.g. by relative
profitability and how much this strategy is adopted by others.
The majority of the theoretical literature able to replicate to some ex-
tent the stylized facts sketched in Section 3 departs, to different degrees,
from the canonical EMH model and falls within two partially overlapping
classes, dubbed Heterogeneous Agents Models (hereafter HAMs) and Agent-
Based Models (hereafter ABMs). Under both perspectives, reviewed in the
following subsections, agents (and their behaviour) stand at the core of the
study, and population heterogeneity is a key common feature (see also Kir-
man, 1992; Levy and Levy, 1996).
4.1 Heterogeneous Agents Models
This class of models, thoroughly surveyed by Hommes (2006), is based
on analytical investigations of the dynamical (deterministic and stochas-
tic) systems representing the laws of motion of the economy. Most of these
works are behavioural models with boundedly rational agents using differ-
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ent heuristics or rule of thumb strategies. Typical results are highly non-
linear, e.g. due to evolutionary switching between strategies, and exhibit
a wide range of dynamic behaviour, ranging from a unique stable steady-
state to complex and chaotic motions. Early applications to the financial
markets framework aimed at studying the interaction between fundamen-
talist and chartist traders (see e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1986, 1987a, 1987b,
1990a, 1990b; Zeeman, 1974), the effect of limits to arbitrage, say, when
it is risky for rational arbitrageurs to correct mispricing caused by non-
rational traders (e.g. because mispricing may get worse in the short run
when a majority of traders adopts a trend following strategy), and the ef-
fect of noise traders in the sense of Kyle (1985) and Black (1986), i.e. in-
vestors whose changes in asset demand are not caused by news about eco-
nomic fundamentals but rather by non-fundamental considerations such as
changes in expectations or market sentiment (see e.g. DeLong et al., 1990a,
1990b; Shiller, 1984). More recent milestones in financial literature under
such approach are now briefly outlined. Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998)
introduce the concept of adaptively rational equilibrium in which agents adapt
over time by choosing rationally from a finite set of different predictors, de-
pending on their relative past performance; applying such tool to a financial
asset pricing model, they obtain highly irregular equilibrium price conver-
gence paths to strange, chaotic attractors when the intensity of choice to
switch prediction strategies is high, supporting the idea of local instability
and global complicated dynamics as possible features of a fully rational no-
tion of equilibrium. Chiarella and He (2001, 2002a, 2002b) extended this
framework by allowing agents to have different risk attitudes and differ-
ent expectations formation schemes for both first and second moments of
the price distribution under walrasian and market maker scenarios, find-
ing that the introduction of heterogeneity has a double-edged effect on as-
set prices: on the one hand heterogeneous forecasting rules may balance
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out in the aggregate, and dynamics with learning may be locally stable;
on the other hand heterogeneity acts as a source of instability, eventually
leading to periodic or even chaotic fluctuations in asset prices. Lux (1995)
introduces a formalisation of herd behaviour through mutual mimetic con-
tagion that yields transient bubble phenomena and repeated fluctuations
around fundamental values. Gaunesdorfer (2000) and Gaunesdorfer and
Hommes (2000) propose a nonlinear structural model with endogenous
belief heterogeneity in which, although fundamentals are proxied by an
i.i.d. process, volatility clustering arises, as asset prices switch irregularly
between a small-price-fluctuation and a large-price-fluctuation regime. Fi-
nally, Anufriev and Bottazzi (2010), Anufriev et al. (2006), and Anufriev
and Dindo (2010) introduce and exploit tools such as the equilibrium market
line and the concept of procedurally rational equilibrium to provide remarkable
results about asymptotic dominance of different trading strategies in terms
of relative performances, and subsequent wealth-driven selection. Besides
the great achievements reached through the HAM methodology, a couple
of intrinsic features are, in our opinion, rather binding. The need for ana-
lytical tractability often leads to restrictive simplifying assumptions, even
when phenomena are complex by their very nature, and preferably require
such complexity to be studied as is. Moreover, most of the results obtained
under this approach focus on the asymptotic properties of the models. On
the contrary, the methodological perspective that we propose here, takes
the full sample paths as transients of the evolving dynamics.
4.2 Complexity and Agent-Based Models
A system is typically defined to be complex if it is composed of interacting
units, and if exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the
interactions of the units that are not properties of the individual units them-
selves (see e.g. Flake, 1998). Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE)
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consists in the “computational study of economies modelled as evolving systems of
autonomous interacting agents” (see Tesfatsion, 2003) and originated after the
recognition that decentralized market economies are complex adaptive sys-
tems (see Arthur et al., 1997a; Kirman, 2011; Rosser Jr., 2000), i.e. consisting
of large numbers of reactive and adaptive agents involved in parallel local
interactions (see also Holland, 2006). Under the ACE perspective, the word
agent broadly refers to “bundled data and behavioural methods representing an
entity constituting part of a computationally constructed world” (see Tesfatsion,
2006). Agents can be either individuals (e.g. consumers, workers), social
groupings (e.g. families, firms), institutions (e.g., markets, regulatory sys-
tems), or other biological and physical entities (such as crops, stockpiles,
weather). Moreover, agents can be composed of other agents, thus permit-
ting hierarchical constructions. ABMs are particularly suitable for grasping
the very emergence of otherwise unpredictable phenomena2:
Emergence is generally understood to be a process that leads to the appearance of
structure not directly described by the defining constraints and instantaneous
forces that control a system. Over time ‘something new’ appears at scales not
directly specified by the equations of motion. An emergent feature also cannot
be explicitly represented in the initial and boundary conditions. In short, a
feature emerges when the underlying system puts some effort into its creation.
Crutchfield (1994)
Indeed, ABMs are able to capture the intricate two-way feedback between
the micro- and the macro-structure, allowing for a bottom-up, thus micro-
founded, development of processes, as opposed to the top-down construc-
tion of traditional quantitative economic models. The modeller starts by
computationally constructing an economic world comprising multiple in-
teracting units and then steps back to observe the development of the sys-
temover time. Froma computer science perspective, anABM is essentially a
2Lane (1993) uses the term Emergent Hierarchical Organization to cover such ensemble of
phenomena, and states thatArtificialWorlds (say, ABMs) are designed as an engineering
approach to the study of EHO.
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collection of algorithms (procedures) that have been encapsulated into the
methods of software entities called agents. Encapsulation, a well-defined
word in Object-Oriented Programming, captures the way information is
passed (and therefore the extent to which it is available) to every agent (say,
to every instance of the agent class). These models (for a fairly recent re-
view refer to LeBaron, 2006), relying on extensive numerical simulation,
bear the advantage of easily coping with high-dimensional dynamical sys-
tems and are almost insensible to tractability issues, making them a very
flexible and insightful tool, especially when HAMs’ dynamical systems are
hardly solvable. As opposed to these latter, complex learning and adap-
tive mechanisms can be swiftly embedded in ABMs by means of genetic
algorithms (see Dawid, 1999), classifier systems (see Booker et al., 1989), or
artificial neural networks (see Beltratti et al., 1996, although they are gen-
erally considered excessively black-boxed). The remainder of this section
is devoted to a survey of the main contributions to financial literature un-
der this approach. One of the first large-scale computational experiment of
a financial market is the still state-of-the-art Santa Fe Artificial Stock Mar-
ket (see Palmer et al., 1994; Arthur et al., 1997b; LeBaron et al., 1999): it
proposes a theory of asset pricing in an artificial economy where a popula-
tion of heterogeneous traders continually explore new expectational mod-
els, and confirm or discard them according to their performances, there-
fore endogenising individual beliefs. In this setting, two different market
regimes are possible, depending on the rate of exploration of alternative
forecast methods: for a low value of such parameter, the market settles in
a rational-expectations-like equilibrium, in accordance with the efficient-
market literature; under a more realistic rate of exploration, instead, the
market self-organizes into a complex regime in which rich psychological
behaviour emerges and materialises as technical trading strategies who
eventually lead to temporary bubbles and volatility clustering (GARCH be-
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haviour). Another masterpiece, contemporary to the Santa Fe work, is the
Levy-Levy-Solomon Microscopic Simulation Model (see Levy et al., 1994,
1995, 1996): in making their optimal diversification choice between a risky
and a riskless asset, traders employ the ex-post distribution of returns as an
estimate of the ex-ante distribution, keeping track of the last 10 historical ob-
servations. Traders are homogeneously initialised in terms of behavioural
parameters, expectations formation mechanism, and wealth distribution.
The only source of heterogeneity is a normally-distributed random shock
that is added to individual optimal investment, whose variance regulates
the ‘temperature’ of the system. Market suffers discontinuities (e.g. booms
and crashes) especially when the shock variance is low, while, somewhat
counterintuitively, cycles become milder and crashes much smaller if the
‘heater is turned on’. This model bears close similarities with the one we
propose in the next Section, although, after Zschischang and Lux (2001),
we introduce agent heterogeneity bymeans of behavioural parameters such
as the magnitude of risk aversion and of the memory decay factor in expec-
tations formation. Other remarkable contributions in this field of research
include, in chronological order, Beltratti andMargarita (1992), Rieck (1994),
Marengo and Tordjman (1996), Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2001), the Genoa
Artificial Stock Market, later included in the EURACE project (see Cincotti
and Raberto, 2005; Focardi et al., 2002; Marchesi et al., 2003; Raberto et al.,
2003b), Bottazzi et al. (2005), Kirman et al. (2007) Franke and Westerhoff
(2012), Westerhoff (2009), and Westerhoff and Franke (2012a). The model
which follows, starts from a setting common to a number of HAMs and
then develops a computational ABM to investigate the whole dynamics of
the system under different parametrisations.
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5 The model
As already mentioned, our model builds upon the basis put forth by
Anufriev et al. (2012, 2006) and is developed in order to explicitly account
for the whole transitional dynamics of market variables, such as prices, re-
turns, composition of the market-portfolio, and individual ones, such as
the evolution of traders’ wealth-shares. Heterogeneity is introduced both
in traders’ attitude towards risk, and in the way they form beliefs about
future states-of-the-world. The central purpose is to show that, by means
of marginal departures from the mainstream assumptions surveyed above,
the dynamic properties of relevant variables may dramatically change.
Consider a pure-exchange economy populated by a set of agents indexed
by N = f1, . . . , n, . . . ,Ng, where a set of risky long-lived securities, in-
dexed by L = f1, . . . , `, . . . , Lg, and a riskless bond, are traded in discrete
time. Risky securities pay a random dividend d`t at the end of each pe-
riod. Before trade at time t starts, each agent n chooses a fraction x`n,t of the
wealth he possesses, to be invested in security `. The decision is made ac-
cording to currently available information, namely past realized prices and
dividends, and coherently with a constant relative risk averse attitude. The
residual part of wealth not invested in the L risky securities, is risklessly
lent, by means of bond purchase, at a constant exogenous rate of return
r f > 0. The amount of circulating shares of the risky securities is constant,
while the supply of bond is inelastic. Individual demands are then aggre-
gated by a Walrasian auctioneer who announces the end-of-period price
vector pt 2 RL obtained by setting the aggregate excess-demand equal to
zero. Dividends (d1t , . . . , dLt ) and (ex-dividend) prices (p1t , . . . , pLt ) of the
risky securities are expressed in terms of the bond’s price, the latter serv-
ing as the numéraire, conventionally normalized to 1 in every period. The
economy runs through a series of temporary equilibria (see Grandmont, 1985)
where market clearing condition is satisfied. Next Section presents the
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way traders behave and the determinants of the investment functions; Sec-
tions 5.2 and 5.3 define, accordingly, the evolution of individual and aggre-
gatewealth, and derive asset pricing; Section 5.4 specifies the expected util-
ity maximisation problem each trader solves, and the estimators employed
in forming expectations about future states of nature; finally, Section 5.5
defines the whole dynamical system for an economy with heterogeneous
traders.
5.1 Agent behaviour
An individual investment decision is a vector xn,t 2 RL of fractions of
wealth the trader is willing to invest in each risky asset ` at time t. A re-
strictionwe impose here is that investment decision takes place before trade
starts at each round, thus agent information set In,t is restricted to include
only past information on the realization of prices and dividends:
In,t = fp1t, . . . , pLt ; d1t, . . . , dLt j t < tg 8n 2 N , 8t (5.1)
At every time step, all agents costlessly acquire all the relevant information
about the time series of prices and dividends up to the last trade session
t  1; since In,t is unbiased common knowledge we can drop the subscript
n. Current values of prices and dividends, pt and dt, being determined
during time t trade, cannot belong to It.
Investment strategy is the image of a trader-specific investment function:
fn : RtL  ! RL with t < t (5.2)
fn deterministically maps the information set It available at time t into a
portfolio of risky assets xn,t. In a dynamical context the individual invest-
ment fractions are, in general, changing as new information becomes avail-
able. Since the investment decision of agent n at time t is completely de-
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scribed by the vector of investment fractions xn,t, agents adopting the same
strategy can be considered, without loss of generality, as a single agent, thus
we assume there are N distinct investment functions in the economy, each
associated to a level of wealth Wn,t. According to the investment function
defined in (5.2), individual demand for a risky asset ` holds
Z`n,t =
x`n,t Wn,t
p`t
8` 2 L (5.3)
i.e. it equals the amount of wealth allocated for investment in risky asset
` in monetary terms, divided by the still unknown prevailing price of the
asset. A demand function like (5.3) along with the independence of x`n,t
on both wn,t and p`t implies a specific dependence of agent’s demand on
wealth and prices and amounts to assuming that agents have constant rel-
ative risk averse (hereafter CRRA) attitude. This assumption is common to
a number of studies in the HAMs literature (see e.g. Anufriev et al., 2012,
2006; Chiarella and He, 2001; Levy et al., 2000) while other works adopt a
Constant Absolute Risk Averse (CARA) attitude, with demand (rather than
optimal wealth fractions) not depending on current wealth (see e.g. Brock
and Hommes, 1998). Following Levy (1994), we believe CRRA specifica-
tion to closer mimic the way financial decisions are taken in the real world,
where portfolios are often designed as fractions of wealth to be split across
different securities. Finally, notice that the model does not include any con-
sumption in agent behaviour, hence it represents a pure-exchange economy
where traders decisions are reasonably driven by expectations about future
wealth.
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5.2 Agent wealth
Agent wealth at time t consists of the current market value of his portfolio:
Wn,t = An,t  pt + Bn,t (5.4)
where An,t 2 RL denotes the (raw) vector of the amount of risky assets held
by agent n at time t after market clearing, and Bn,t 2 R the corresponding
holding of the bond (whose price is unitary). The inter-temporal evolution
of individual wealth thus develops according to:
Wn,t = Wn,t 1 
 
1 
L
å
`=1
x`n,t 1
!
 (1+ r f ) +Wn,t 1 
L
å
`=1
x`n,t 1 
p`t + d
`
t
p`t 1
= Wn,t 1 
"
x0n,t 1  (1+ r f ) +
L
å
`=1
x`n,t 1 

1+ r`t + e
`
t
#
(5.5)
where x0n,t = 1 åL`=1 x`n,t denotes the fraction of wealth used for the bond
purchase, i.e. the complement to 1 of the risky holdings. This accounting
relation clearly shows the sources of wealth growth, namely capital gain
(i.e. the price rate of return r`t
def
=
p`t
p`t 1
  1) and the dividend yield e`t def= d
`
t
p`t 1
for the share of wealth risky invested, and the riskless rate of return r f for
the share of wealth risklessly lent.
We now state a couple of definitions that will prove useful in the follow-
ing subsections:
 Aggregate wealth: is the sum of all individual wealth levels at a time
instant t:
Wt
def
=
N
å
n=1
Wn,t (5.6)
 Individual wealth-shares: are the ratios of each individual wealth out
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of aggregate wealth at a time instant t:
jn,t
def
=
Wn,t
Wt
8n 2 N (5.7)
 Market portfolio: is the wealth-weighted sum of individual portfo-
lios:
xt
def
=
N
å
n=1
xn,t  jn,t (5.8)
5.3 Asset pricing
Starting with the aforementioned individual demand functions (5.3), we
can normalize, without loss of generality, the supply of each risky asset to
1, such that the pricing condition comes from the equilibrium relation:
N
å
n=1
Zn,t = 1 (5.9)
where 1 = [1, . . . , 1]T 2 RL. Solving for price yields
p`t = Wt  x`t 8` 2 L (5.10)
whereWt is the aggregate wealth at time t and x`t is the `-th component of
the market portfolio. In (5.10) asset prices still appear both in the LHS and
the RHS of the equation, as determinants of the level of wealth (recall eq.
5.5). It is then possible to show that:
Proposition 1. If short positions are not allowed, i.e.
x`n,t 2 (0, 1) 8n = 0, . . . ,N, 8` = 0, . . . , L, 8t (5.11)
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then prevailing prices exist, are unique and strictly positive. Moreover, it holds:
Wt = Wt 1 
x0t 1  (1+ r f ) åL`=1 x`n,t 1  e`t
x0t
(5.12)
p`t = p
`
t 1 
x`t
x`t 1
 x
0
t 1  (1+ r f ) +åL`=1 x`t 1  e`t
x0t
(5.13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that condition (5.11) is only sufficient and in general can be relaxed
for individuals as long as it holds at the aggregate level, i.e. as long as x`t 2
(0, 1), 8` 2 L , 8t. Nonetheless, for the moment, we make the following
Assumption 1. No trader can take short position in any asset, i.e. the image of
traders’ investment functions is restricted such that
fn : RtL  ! (0, 1)L (5.14)
that is, both x`n,t and x0n,t satisfy condition (5.11), 8` 2 L , 8n 2 N , 8t.
5.4 Expectations and the investment function
At every time step, every agent solves an optimisation problem of the form:
max
xt
E [U(Wt)] s.t. Wt = Wt 1 
h
x0t 1  (1+ r f ) + xt 1  (1+ rt + et)
i
(5.15)
For purely notational convenience the subscript n is temporarily dropped
here. U(Wt) represents the trader’s utility function of wealth. In compli-
ance with CRRA attitude, its generic form reads:
U(Wt) =
W1 gt   1
1  g (5.16)
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where g > 0 denotes the individual relative risk-aversion coefficient. Since
the solution of maximisation (5.15) is independent on the current level of
wealth, we need to formally model the way agents form their expectations
over future returns. Here we make an additional assumption:
Assumption 2. The dividend yield e`t is drown at each time step from a L-
dimensional probability distribution with mean e¯ and covariance matrix S.
CoherentlywithAnufriev et al. (2006) andAnufriev et al. (2012), we assume
the trader forms expectations on future returns of risky assets according to
a smooth function of their Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (here-
after EWMA) estimates:
rˆ`t = l 
¥
å
t=0
(1  l)t  r`t t 1 (5.17)
sˆ`,hr,t = l 
¥
å
t=0
(1  l)t 
h
r`t t 1   rˆ`t t 1
i

h
rht t 1   rˆht t 1
i
(5.18)
where rˆ`t and sˆ`hrt denote the trader’s expectations about the return of asset
` and its (co-)variance (with respect to asset h) at time t, and l 2 (0, 1)
is a parameter governing the decay of relative weights between recent and
remote observation of realized returns. The EWMA estimators above also
admit recursive definition:
rˆ`t = (1  l)  rˆ`t 1 + l  r`t 1 (5.19)
sˆ`,hr,t = (1  l)  sˆ`,hr,t 1 + l  (1  l)2 
h
r`t 1   rˆ`t 1
i

h
rht 1   rˆht 1
i
(5.20)
Applying the same mean-variance approximation employed in Chiarella
andHe (2001) andAnufriev et al. (2012), the individual investment function
holds:
x`t = f
` (It) = 1
g
 Cˆ 1t 
h
Et r f  1
i
(5.21)
where Et and Cˆ 1t are, respectively, the vector of expected total returns
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and the inverse of the expected variance-covariancematrix, whose elements
read:
E`t = e
` + d  rˆ`t (5.22)
Cˆ
`,h
t = sˆ
`,h
r,t + s
`,h
e (5.23)
The d coefficient, introduced by Chiarella and He (2001), characterizes the
relation of present investment choice to past market dynamics. This param-
eter distinguishes between different stylized types of trading behaviour: if
d = 0 the trader acts as a fundamentalist since his investment choice is un-
affected by past return realizations; if d 6= 0 the agents is a chartist, specifi-
cally a trend-chaser for d > 0 and a trend-contrarian for d < 0. Higher values
of past returns lead to riskier investment choices for trend followers and
to ‘safer’ investment choices for contrarians. Following Assumption 2 the
term s`,he is null, as we assume i.i.d. dividend process, hence showing no
cross-correlation between different risky assets.
5.5 The economy with heterogeneous agents
Starting from the relations provided in the preceding subsections, we are
now able to derive the overall dynamics of an economy populated by N
heterogeneous trader, which is described by a [N(3L+ 1)  1]-dimensional
system of first-order difference equations: the first N  L equations are the
individual investment functions (5.21), whose arguments are the EWMA
estimates En,t and Cn,t of future price returns and their variance; these es-
timates, in turns, correspond to the second and third (N  L)-size sets of
equations. Last, there remain the equations describing the evolution of
individual wealth(-shares) according to (5.5), which count N   1 as, by
definition, last-trader’s wealth-share can be computed complementarily, as
jN,t = 1 åN 1n=1 jn,t. Rather than employing analytical methods to study
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this high dimensional dynamical system (refer to Anufriev et al. (2006) for
a deterministic skeleton analysis of the system for L = 1 and to Anufriev
et al., 2012 for a procedurally rational equilibrium analysis of the system for
L > 1), we perform, in the next Section, an agent-based numerical simu-
lation, in order to account for the step-by-step evolution of the relevant dy-
namics.
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6 Simulation and results
Starting from the financial HAM sketched in the previous Section, we
are now able to perform numerical simulations3 under different scenarios.
Here we investigate the case for L = 1, that is, with only one risky asset
(that can be nevertheless intended as an index of risky assets itself) and we
focus on the dynamics of its price (remember the bond acts as numèraire),
the evolution of relative wealth-shares of the traders, and the overall riski-
ness of the market portfolio. The choice of initial conditions is deliberately
arbitrary and these need no calibration on any specific financial dataset, as
our simulation is not intended to exactly fit any existing time series. We are
able to show two distinct results: the first one, in Section 6.1, concerns the
selection mechanism the market operates, and is able, to a good extent, to
replicate the findings of Anufriev et al. (2006) about the asymptotic domi-
nance of different trading strategies; the second, in Section 6.2, focusses on
the rich and anything but linear transitional dynamics of the price series in
its adjustment towards the equilibrium.
6.1 Market selection and survival patterns
The first simulation we carry out focusses on the evolution of individual
wealth-shares jn,t in order to study the waymarket selection occurs among
different trading strategies. We sketch the following:
Definition 1. A trader n is said to “survive” the economy if his long-run wealth-
share is significantly different from 0, i.e. if limt!¥ jn,t > 0. A trader n is said
to “dominate” the economy if his long-run wealth-share is significantly close to 1,
i.e. if limt!¥ jn,t = 1.
3Algorithms are coded in Java™ and implementedwith openJDK v. 7u60; randomnumber
generation relies upon colt libraries v. 1.2.0.
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Description Value
Initial population size N = 200
Number of risky assets L = 1
Static population true
Riskless rate of return r f = 0.02
g distribution gn  U (1.0, 1000.0)
l distribution ln = 0.1, 8n 2 N
d distribution dn = 1.0, 8n 2 N
Initial wealth endowment Wn,0 = 50.0, 8n 2 N
Yield mean e = 0.04
Yield variance s2e = 1.0e-4
Yield realisation distribution et  N (e, s2e )
Initial risky asset price level p0 = 0.1
x`n admissible interval xn,t 2 [0.01, 0.99], 8n 2 N , 8t
Table 1: Parameters and initial conditions
Anufriev et al. (2006) show that, underAssumption 1, two types of equilib-
ria are possible: one featuring a single survivor (who therefore dominates
the economy), and one with multiple survivors. Strictly speaking, the first
one can be considered as a particular case of the second. Studying the sta-
bility conditions for a generic single-survivor equilibrium, they are also able
to show that, in those equilibria where the condition r >  e is satisfied,
i.e. where the overall wealth of the economy grows, the survivor must be
the most ‘aggressive’ trader, say, the one who, among the others, invests the
highest share of wealth xn,t in the risky security (or, equivalently, the low-
est share of wealth x0n,t in the bond). Our first simulation is devoted to the
validation of this result. Initialisation parameters are listed in Table 1 (index
` is dropped for notational convenience). We keep a steady population of
200 traders which differ one to each other in their risk aversion coefficient
g. Memory decay factor l of expectation formation and overall sensibility
coefficient d to the EWMAestimates are kept constant across the population
in order to focus on the role of differences in themagnitude of risk aversion.
If both ln = l and dn = d, 8n 2 N , there is a monotone relation between
the risk aversion coefficient and the riskiness of the optimal solution of the
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UMP: cœteris paribus, the lower gn the higher xn,t (see eq. 5.21). It is impor-
tant to notice here that at the beginning of the run, wealth is evenly (uni-
formly) distributed among all traders, so that whatever inequality may arise
as trading takes place must be induced only by differences in behavioural
attitudes, as no trader starts trading with any relative advantage in terms
of purchasing power. At time t = 0 each trader faces the market holding a
riskless portfolio worthWn,0, entirely consisting of bond shares. The risky
security is exogenously priced p0, and carries no information on past prices
and dividend (in other words, the first iteration can be regarded as an IPO).
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the individual wealth-share for the trader
featuring the lowest value of g, in two typical runs. As suggested, with time
going by, the least-risk-averse trader tends to increase his own wealth more
than any other, and eventually the whole aggregate wealth will concen-
trate in his hands, making him a lone survivor, necessarily dominating the
economy. Even without a clear-cut definition of time horizon, it is straight-
forward to notice that the adjustment mechanism needs not be monotone
in the short run, where other traders (who will not survive at the equilib-
rium) may locally perform better; long run graph (or its moving average)
nonetheless looks roughly monotone. Although the speed of adjustment
may vary for purely stochastic reasons, e.g. it takes about 50% longer for
the trader to dominate the economy for a given confidence level (0.001) in
the second run with respect to the first (circa 1,500 vs. 1,000 iterations), it is
highly influenced by the width of the support parameter gn is drawn from.
Figure 2 shows the same type of graph as before, but for a narrower inter-
val of coefficient g support. With respect to Table 1, the only difference here
is that gn  U (100.0, 1000.0). It is immediate to notice that it now takes a
considerably larger amount of time (circa 19,000 iterations) for the ‘lucky’
trader to wipe all the other agents out of the economy, at the same con-
fidence level. A direct consequence of the dominance condition sketched
34
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
iteration
w
ea
lt
h 
sh
ar
e
(a) A typical run.
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(b) Another typical run.
Figure 1: Evolution of the wealth-share for the least-risk-averse trader.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the wealth-share for the least-risk-averse trader.
Narrower g support: gn  U (100.0, 1000.0)
above is that, in order to have a multiple-survivor equilibrium, all invest-
ment shares xn,t for those n’s belonging to the survivors’ subset of N have
to be identical one to each other. This implies that an economy composed of
N heterogeneous traders with randomly defined investment functions (e.g.
with at least one parameter appearing, directly or indirectly, in the invest-
ment function (5.21) drawn from a continuous non-degenerate distribution)
has probability zero of displaying an equilibrium with more than one sur-
vivor. We are able to show that it is still possible to obtain equilibria with
multiple survivors if we model the short-selling restriction, see condition
(5.11), by introducing a lower and an upper bound on the values the invest-
ment function can take, thus truncating all values below (above) the lower
bound (the upper bound) and setting them equal to the associated bound.
If, for instance, we impose the condition x`n,t 2 [10 k, 1  10 k], 8n 2 N , 8t,
and k > 0, trivially, if there are two traders willing to short-sell (leverage-
buy) the risky asset, given their expectations, they will end up with the
same (sub-)optimal investment x`n,t = 10 k (respectively, x`n,t = 1  10 k).
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Description Value
Initial population size N = 200
Number of risky assets L = 1
Static population true
Riskless rate of return r f = 0.02
g distribution gn  U (1.0, 1000.0)
l distribution ln = 0.01, 8n 2 N
d distribution dn = 1.0, 8n 2 N
Initial wealth endowment Wn,0 = 50.0, 8n 2 N
Yield mean e = 0.04
Yield variance s2e = 1.0e-4
Yield realisation distribution et  N (e, s2e )
Initial risky asset price level p0 = 0.1
x`n admissible interval xn,t 2 [0.01, 0.99], 8n 2 N , 8t
Table 2: Parameters and initial conditions
This assumption, for k = 2, was already present in the previous simula-
tion, but it was not binding as the l coefficient was high enough to require
a larger amount of time for the equilibrium to be eventually reached than
the wealth-driven selection mechanism to operate. Anufriev et al. (2006)
provide a complete analysis of the deterministic skeleton steady-states of
the system and their stability characterisation; here is sufficient to have in
mind that, cœteris paribus, the equilibrium stability domain decreases with
the value of the survivor’s l, and there exists a threshold beyond which
stability is lost and neither wealth-shares, nor price, converge to a unique
value. In the next simulation we propose (see Table 2 for initial conditions),
we still keep parameter l constant across the population, but we reduce
its value from 0.1 to 0.01. This change makes traders revise their expec-
tations much slower, and the magnitude of sudden price swings is much
less perceived. At the time equilibrium is reached, aggregate wealth is less
concentrated than before, with more than one survivor now featuring sig-
nificantly positive wealth-shares. Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of the
wealth-shares for the traders with the lowest, second-lowest, and highest
gn, respectively corresponding to the highest, second-highest, and lowest
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(a) Trader with lowest gn. jn = 0.222
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(b) Trader with second-lowest gn. jn = 0.166
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(c) Trader with highest gn. jn = 2.6e-6
Figure 3: Multiple-survivor equilibrium. Evolution of wealth-shares.
A typical run.
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(a) Trader with lowest gn. jn = 0.365
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(b) Trader with second-lowest gn. jn = 0.304
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(c) Trader with highest gn. jn = 9.9e-6
Figure 4: Multiple-survivor equilibrium. Evolution of wealth-shares.
Another typical run.
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equilibrium wealth-share jn, in two distinct runs. Plots (a) and (b) of each
figure are almost superimposable but for an homothetic expansion, as the
only difference lies in the overall riskiness of individual portfolios, driven
by the risk-aversion coefficient only. Plot (c) is likewise interesting, as it
shows that high-risk-averse investment functions may locally outperform
low-risk-averse ones: indeed, it is immediate to notice that the timing of
sharp increases in the highest-gn trader’s wealth-share corresponds to that
of sharp decreases for low-gn traders’. This result was also present in previ-
ous simulations (e.g. see again Figure 1), although it is much more evident
here.
6.2 Transitional dynamics and emerging cycles
Numerical simulation, as we said, proves crucially useful in keeping track
of the whole transitional dynamics of a system starting from whatever ar-
bitrary initial conditions, and (possibly) settling into an equilibrium con-
vergence path. In this section, we wish to analyse the evolution of the risky
asset price series in order to grasp the extent towhich it is explainable on the
grounds of underlying fundamentals, i.e. the only exogenous component
driving traders’ expectations. Recall that, in our model, fundamentals are
proxied by the dividend yield process, which, followingAssumption 2, we
assume roughly stationary and independent of price. We remove, for this
reason, the exogenous expansionary component in eq. (5.13), letting price
be uniquely determined by the evolution of the market portfolio. As usual,
we characterise the dynamics both in terms of the risk-aversion coefficient
g and of the memory decay factor l. Let us start with the initial conditions
listed in Table 3. There are 1,000 fully trend-chaser traders, heterogeneous
in their risk-aversion coefficient, evenly endowed with the same amount of
initial wealth W0, and whose expectations updating factor is constant and
set to l = 0.0036. Resulting price dynamics is plotted in Figure 5. Thank
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Description Value
Initial population size N = 1, 000
Number of risky assets L = 1
Static population true
Riskless rate of return r f = 0.02
g distribution gn  U (1.0, 500.0)
l distribution ln = 0.0036, 8n 2 N
d distribution dn = 1.0, 8n 2 N
Initial wealth endowment Wn,0 = 50.0, 8n 2 N
Yield mean e = 0.04
Yield variance s2e = 1.0e-4
Yield realisation distribution et  N (e, s2e )
Initial risky asset price level p0 = 0.1
x`n admissible interval xn,t 2 [0.01, 0.99], 8n 2 N , 8t
Table 3: Parameters and initial conditions
to the remarkably low value of l, the price adjusts very smoothly and in
a monotonic path towards its equilibrium value p = 15.48. The particu-
lar chosen value of l is actually a threshold: it is possible to show that for
l < 0.0036 the qualitative behaviour of price dynamics is closely similar
to Figure 5, although the equilibrium price may vary. In particular, in the
interval (0, 0.0036] a monotonic relation between the memory decay factor
and equilibrium price holds: the lower l, the lower p, with, asymptoti-
cally, p ! p0 as l ! 0. By very slightly extending, cœteris paribus, the
memory of the traders to l = 0.00365 the adjustment path is drastically
rearranged, monotonicity is broken, and equilibrium price is significantly
shifted upwards. Figure 6 plots the new dynamics. Up to (circa) iteration
1,500, the figure proceeds identically to Figure 5, but for the speed of adjust-
ment which is indiscernibly greater than before, thank to the increase in l.
Such increase in the speed, however, prompts one or more high-risk-averse
trader, who have not yet been completely ruled out by market selection, to
sell, as the increase in the expected return variance is not completely offset
by the increase in the expected value of price return. In the long run, by the
way, low-risk-averse traders will increasingly dominate as showed in Sec-
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Figure 5: Price dynamics. Smooth convergence to equilibrium. p = 15.48
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Figure 6: Price dynamics. Emergent fluctuation before equilibrium conver-
gence. p = 25.75
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Figure 7: Price dynamics. Wide fluctuations before equilibrium conver-
gence. p = 75.01
tion 6.1, and price grows up to the point selection is terminated. By further
increasing the value of l, the resulting dynamics turns more complicated,
with multiple price swings which can be regarded as bubble-and-bust cy-
cles, up to a point stability is lost, as previously hinted at, and the price
fluctuates indefinitely in a limit-cycle-like motion, with no convergence to
an equilibrium value. This second threshold, in our experiment, is found
to be approximately l  0.16, leaving a large room, within the theoretical
support of the parameter, in which a clear-cut wealth-driven selection does
not occur: as previously recognised, such selection mechanism is strongly
subordinated to system stability, thus to the value of the trend extrapolation
rate. Figures 7 and 8 show the price dynamics for l = 0.155 and l = 0.16,
respectively, other parameters being those of Table 3. With a finite popu-
lation, the exact thresholds of the parameter l denoting the lost of mono-
tonicity in convergence first, and overall stability after, are sensible to the
way traders are initialised, that is, to the specific values of gn drawn from
the associate distribution. Nevertheless, after performing several distinct
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Figure 8: Price dynamics. No equilibrium convergence.
runs, we found thresholdsmove awayvery slightly from the values outlined
above. Turning now the focus on the effect of the risk-aversion coefficient on
the price dynamics, we start by shrinking its support to gn  U (1.0, 100.0).
Arguably, the average population risk-aversion is lower, pushing equilib-
rium price upwards to a value higher than before. Figure 9 shows such re-
sult, for l = 0.0036 (which, in the new parameter set, is still lower than the
first l threshold), thus ensuring comparability with Figure 5. As expected,
equilibrium price now reads p = 16.13. Another consequence of the lower
population average risk-aversion is a rightward shift of the thresholdwhere
monotonicity is lost, which now holds l  0.008. Similarly, l values above
that threshold trigger price fluctuations which are now sharper than previ-
ously observed: an example is provided in Figure 10, which shows the price
dynamics for l = 0.01. Notably, a seemingly small variation (Dl = 0.0064)
of the parameter brings a 20-fold increase in equilibrium price, which now
reads p = 329.35. On the other hand, following stability analysis by
Anufriev et al. (2006), the second threshold is shifted leftwards, as overall
riskier investing tends to destabilise the market, for a given value of l. Val-
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Figure 9: Price dynamics with narrower g support. Smooth convergence to
equilibrium. p = 16.13
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Figure 10: Price dynamics with narrower g support. Convergence with
sharp fluctuations. p = 329.35
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ues beyond this second threshold yield a plot similar to Figure 8. Another
emergent property we encountered in the lower-overall-g case is that, if we
introduce a second heterogeneity feature, letting l vary across the popu-
lation along with g, a similar non-convergent dynamics is obtained, even
though the support of l lies within the stability threshold. An example is
given by the case for ln  U (0.01, 0.1), when gn  U (1.0, 100.0) (recall that
for ln = 0.01, 8n 2 N equilibrium price reads p = 329.35, while it is
possible to show that for ln = 0.1, 8n 2 N equilibrium price exists and
equals p = 959.91). This is not the case, instead if gn  U (1.0, 500.0), for
which convergence still applies. This finding suggests that, if, on average,
the population risk-aversion is low enough, heterogeneity in l, i.e. in the
extent to which different traders adapt to new information, may act as a
destabilising force itself. On the other hand, however, it is possible to show
that the case for gn  U (1.0, 100.0) is not intrinsically more fragile than the
one for gn  U (1.0, 500.0). We investigate this point, back to the case with
homogeneous l, by introducing a random repeated shock hitting traders’
investment functions: suchmicro-failuremakes, every t periods, a randomly
selected trader sell his entire risky portfolio, irrespectively of his expecta-
tions about future price return. Basically, at the time the failure strikes, and
for that time step only, the investment strategy of the selected trader n is
forced to xn,t = 0, implying he will lend all his wealth by means of the
bond4. We believe such a failure can be regarded as a reasonable and likely
feature of human behaviour, e.g. proxying the sudden fear of a market
crash, or, speaking about financial bubbles, the belief of being the so-called
greatest fool. Figure 11 shows the price dynamics for the same parameters of
Table 3 except gn  U (1.0, 100.0), and with failure striking every t = 15
periods. During the first 1,500 iterations, the plot is largely comparable to
the one in Figure 9, and the failure has a negligible effect, since aggregate
4Notice also that, as long as just one or a few traders are concerned, sufficient condition
(5.11) may not be satisfied, but results of Proposition 1 hold anyway.
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Figure 11: Price dynamics with micro-failure striking every t = 15 periods.
Risk-aversion coefficient gn  U (1.0, 100.0).
wealth is initially evenly distributed, and market selection takes some time
to operate. Gradually, with increasing wealth concentration, the influence
of the failure on prevailing price becomes relevant, and the magnitude of
its effect strictly depends on the actual wealth-share of the selected trader.
The plot preserves an overall monotonicity, but the price fails to converge
to an equilibrium, and keeps fluctuating noisily and indefinitely around a
constant value, highlighting the fact that wealth-driven selection is even-
tually overwhelmed by the shock and fails to operate from a certain pe-
riod afterwards. Applying the very same behavioural shock to the case for
gn  U (1.0, 500.0) and other parameters equal, yields a significantly differ-
ent transient: see Figure 12. Up to circa iteration 1,500 the reasoning holds
as usual; then, as soon as an enough powerful trader (in terms of wealth-
share) is hit by the failure, the sudden (although limited) plunge in the price
prompts the most risk-averse traders (who are now more averse than be-
fore) to sell the security during subsequent iterations, whose dropping price
will in turns push other traders towards safer positions, eventually trigger-
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Figure 12: Price dynamics with micro-failure striking every t = 15 periods.
Risk-aversion coefficient gn  U (1.0, 500.0).
ing a ‘selling spree’, in which the price eventually spirals downwards up to
the point expected variance is low enough to convince investors of taking
riskier positions. The cycle then repeats itself as long as the failure keeps
striking. It is out of the scope of this paper to provide a precise estimate
of the various thresholds involved. It is of crucial interest, instead, show-
ing that the emergent properties observed, i.e. the bubble-and-bust cycles
shown in Figures 6, 7 and 10, preserve robustness with respect to the in-
troduction of fundamentalist and trend-contrarian traders in the economy.
On the one hand, the presence of fundamentalists is expected to stabilise
the price of an asset, as they act against chartists whenever current price
deviates from its fundamental value. On the other hand, trend-contrarians
shall offset the attemptmade by trend-chasers to exacerbate the price trend,
by acting in a symmetrical manner with respect to these latter. Following
Chiarella and He (2001), we exploit the d parameter in eq. (5.22) to differ-
entiate the agents with respect to their trading approach. Parameters and
initial conditions are listed in Table 4. In particular, we assume dn to be nor-
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Description Value
Initial population size N = 1, 000
Number of risky assets L = 1
Static population true
Riskless rate of return r f = 0.02
g distribution gn  U (1.0, 500.0)
l distribution ln = 0.05, 8n 2 N
d distribution dn  N (0, 1)
Initial wealth endowment Wn,0 = 50.0, 8n 2 N
Yield mean e = 0.04
Yield variance s2e = 1.0e-4
Yield realisation distribution et  N (e, s2e )
Initial risky asset price level p0 = 0.1
x`n admissible interval xn,t 2 [0.01, 0.99], 8n 2 N , 8t
Table 4: Parameters and initial conditions
mally distributed, meaning that most of traders are quasi-fundamentalists,
as probability density is concentrated around the (zero) mean value, and
that chartists are well balanced between trend-chasers and contrarians, as
the density is symmetric around the mean. If the memory of the traders
is short enough, the result is pretty similar to the trend-chasers-only case:
compare Figure 13, simulated for l = 0.05, with Figures 5 and 9, and no-
tice also that the presence of fundamentalists let monotonicity be preserved
for a larger-than-before extrapolation rate. By increasing the value of l, as
previously obtained, price dynamics suffers large swings before settling to-
wards an equilibrium, even though fluctuations have a different shape and
look less sharp: see Figure 14, simulated for l = 0.1. Setting different sup-
port for the risk-aversion coefficient yields results similar to the constant
d = 1.0 case, with a negative relation between the population average risk-
aversion and equilibrium price: see e.g. Figure 15, obtained for l = 0.1
and gn  U (1.0, 1000.0), featuring a lower equilibrium price than in Figure
14. Notice also that, with heterogeneity applying to both g and d, the exact
value of equilibrium price may be influenced, especially when dealing with
small populations, by the random process initialising traders’ behavioural
49
0 100 200 300 400
0
2
4
6
8
10
iteration
pr
ic
e
Figure 13: Price dynamics. Fundamentalists vs. chartists. l = 0.05
Smooth convergence towards equilibrium. p = 10.36
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Figure 14: Price dynamics. Fundamentalists vs. chartists. l = 0.1
Convergence with fluctuations. p = 34.86
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Figure 15: Price dynamics. Fundamentalists vs. chartists. Larger g support.
l = 0.1 Convergence with fluctuations. p = 5.47
parameters: for instance, it can happen that a trader featuring a quite low
risk-aversion coefficient also has a d very close to zero, or that a strong trend-
chaser might be, at the same time, very risk-averse. By the way, as long as
we are interested in the evolution of transitional dynamics, rather than the
specific final price, simulations with both chartists and fundamentalists do
nothing else than add robustness to the previous findings concerning the
decoupling of the price dynamics from the dividend yield process we ob-
tained in the all-trend-chasers case.
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7 Concluding remarks and further research
We study an asset pricing model where adapting heterogeneous traders
take portfolio decisions as smooth function of their ExponentiallyWeighted
MovingAverage estimates of future asset return and variance. Expectations
are based uniquely on past market history and on the risky asset dividend
yield, which we intend as a proxy for fundamentals. The assumptions we
impose include the yield process being governed by a stationary distribu-
tion, and short-selling restriction on investment. Time is discrete, and at the
end of each period market clearing price is announced by a fictional wal-
rasian auctioneer. Traders are mean-variance myopic optimisers and have
CRRA attitude, implying that their invested shares of wealth do not depend
on their wealth level, or equivalently, that individual demand functions are
proportional to individual wealth. We set up a numerical simulation of the
system, featuring one risky and one riskless asset, and an arbitrarily large
population of traders who differ in their relative risk-aversion coefficient,
their memory decay factor in the EWMA estimators, and their trading strat-
egy, i.e. they can act as fundamentalists or chartists (either trend-chasers
or contrarians). While we mainly focus on theoretical aspects and seek no
particular fit into actually observed financial time-series, our results are in-
tended as a contribution to the growing literature on artificial agent-based
stock markets. By analysing the evolution of individual wealth-shares, we
are able to replicate some of the findings already present in previous liter-
ature concerning the asymptotic dominance of different investment func-
tions. In particular we show that, in a all-chartist framework, either single-
and multiple-survivor equilibria are possible, largely depending on the pa-
rameter regulating traders’ memory: in particular, when traders present
long backward-looking horizon in forming expectations, a strong wealth-
driven selection mechanism applies, and only the most-aggressive (e.g. the
least-risk-averse) trader asymptotically survives and therefore dominates
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the economy. Reducing such horizon makes the selection process oper-
ate only partially, and more than one trader eventually survives. When,
instead, traders take into account only a few last observations, the system
loses stability and there is no convergence to an equilibrium outcome. Co-
herently, shifting the focus on the price dynamics, we show that, if traders’
memory is homogeneous across the population and is long enough, the
price of the risky security smoothly adjusts and monotonously converge
to an equilibrium value, irrespectively of the heterogeneity in risk-aversion
(captured by the width of the associated coefficient distribution support).
Reducing the memory beyond a certain threshold, but still assuming val-
ues which we repute rather reasonable for a technical analyst attempting to
extrapolate the historical trend, brings a dramatic change in the overall dy-
namics, triggering the emergence of one or more bubble-and-bust-like cy-
cles before the system settles into an equilibrium convergence path. A sim-
ilar rich dynamics is also obtained in the longer-memory framework in two
different experiments: i) by introducing memory heterogeneity among the
traders, if average population risk-aversion is sufficiently low; ii) by intro-
ducing amicro-failure, repeatedly (even loosely) hitting traders’ investment
decisions, if risk-aversion coefficient distribution support is wide enough;
in this case, however, the equilibrium is not reached as long as the shock
keeps striking. These experiments make us conclude that both heterogene-
ity in risk-aversion, and low overall risk-aversion may singularly produce a
destabilising effect. As before, with exceedingly naïve expectations, stabil-
ity is lost and the price fluctuates indefinitely in a limit-cycle-like motion.
Finally, we extend the experiment displaying bubble-and-bust transitional
dynamics, by adopting a different population, largely composed by quasi-
fundamentalists and well balanced crowds of trend-chasers and contrari-
ans. In spite of the existence of fundamentalists and contrarians, who are
generally expected to counteract the aggressiveness of trend-chasers, the
53
emergence of booms and crashes is validated, though fluctuations may ex-
hibit different shape or amplitude, adding further robustness to our find-
ings.
To sumup, ourmodel is able to show that, for all-but-unreasonable values
of traders’ memory, short-selling restriction and risk-aversion heterogene-
ity are sufficient conditions to trigger a sharp decoupling of the price dy-
namics from the fundamental process, driven by a market selection mech-
anism that rewards the least-risk-averse traders and pushes the system to-
wards higher than fundamental equilibria. During transition, a very rich
dynamics is obtained without further assumptions, with emergent bubble-
and-bust cycles arising uniquely from the market interaction of the traders
involved. On the other hand, our model is not able to replicate the whole
ensemble of stylised facts observable in real financial markets.
Our framework can be further extended in a number of directions. A
straightforward improvement is to distinctly account for multiple (instead
of just one, or an index of) risky assets. This allows to study the cross-
correlation structure of different assets returns and to investigate the condi-
tions prompting the emergence of excess covariance. Perhapsmore interest-
ingly, themodel can be enriched by implementingmore realisticmethods in
decision-making, such as those prescribed by prospect theory (see Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), rule-based techniques, articulated learning processes
(e.g. through classifier systems or genetic algorithms), and herd behaviour.
Our guess is that a sharper departure from rationality assumptions and, re-
latedly, a more structured modelling of agents’ behaviour are required in
order to obtain dynamics that are closer to reality.
54
This page intentionally left blank.
References
Anufriev, M. and G. Bottazzi (2010). “Market Equilibria under Procedural
Rationality”. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 46.6, pp. 1140–1172.
Anufriev, M., G. Bottazzi, M.Marsili, and P. Pin (2012). “Excess covariance
and dynamic instability in a multi-asset model”. In: Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 36.8, pp. 1142–1161.
Anufriev, M., G. Bottazzi, and F. Pancotto (2006). “Equilibria, stability
and asymptotic dominance in a speculative market with heterogeneous
traders”. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30.09–10, pp. 1787–
1835.
Anufriev, M. and P. Dindo (2010). “Wealth-driven Selection in a Financial
Market with Heterogeneous Agents”. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 73, pp. 327–358.
Arthur (1995). “Complexity in economic and financial markets”. In: Com-
plexity 1, pp. 20–25.
Arthur, W. B. (2006). “Out-of-Equilibrium Economics and Agent-Based
Modeling”. In: Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume 2. Ed. by L.
Tesfatsion and K. L. Judd. North Holland.
Arthur, W. B., S. N. Durlauf, and D. A. Lane (1997a). The Economy as an
Evolving Complex System II. Addison-Wesley.
Arthur, W. B., J. H. Holland, B. LeBaron, and R. G Palmer (1997b). “Asset
Pricing Under Endogenous Expectation in an Artificial Stock Market”.
In: The Economy as an Evolving Complex System II. Ed. by W. B. Arthur, S.
Durlauf, and D. Lane. Addison-Wesley.
Bachelier, L. (1900). “Théorie de la speculation”. In: Annales Scientifiques de
L’École Normale Supérieure 17, pp. 21–86.
Beltratti, A. and S. Margarita (1992). “Simulating an Artificial Adaptive
Stock Market”. Mimeo - Turin University.
56
Beltratti, N., S. Margarita, and P. Terna (1996). Neural Networks for Eco-
nomic and Financial Modelling. Thomson Computer Press.
Black (1986). “Noise”. In: Journal of Finance 41, pp. 529–543.
Black, F. and M. Scholes (1973). “The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities”. In: Journal of Political Economy 81.3, pp. 637–654.
Booker, L. B., D. E. Goldberg, and J. H. Holland (1989). “Classifier Systems
and Genetic Algorithms”. In: Artificial Intelligence 40, pp. 235–282.
Bottazzi, G., G. Dosi, and I. Rebesco (2005). “Institutional architectures and
behavioral ecologies in the dynamics of financial markets”. In: Journal of
Mathematical Economics 41.09–10, pp. 197–228.
Brock, W. and C. Hommes (1997). “A rational route to randomness”. In:
Econometrica 65, pp. 1059–1095.
Brock, W. and C. Hommes (1998). “Heterogeneous Beliefs and Routes to
Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model”. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 22.8–9, pp. 1235–1274.
Buiter, W. H. (2009). “The Unfortunate Uselessness of most ‘State of the
Art’ Academic Monetary Economics”. FT.com/Maverecon. url: http://
blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/03/the-unfortunate-uselessness-
of-most-state-of-the-art-academic-monetary-economics/#more-
667.
Chiarella, C. and X. He (2001). “Asset price and wealth dynamics under
heterogeneous expectations”. In: Quantitative Finance 1, pp. 509–526.
Chiarella, C. and X. He (2002a). “Heterogeneous Beliefs, Risk and Learn-
ing in a Simple Asset Pricing Model”. In: Computational Economics 19.1,
pp. 95–132.
Chiarella, C. and X. He (2002b). “An AdaptiveModel on Asset Pricing and
Wealth Dynamics with Heterogeneous Trading Strategies”. Quantitative
Finance Research Centre, University of Technology, Sydney - Working
Paper 84.
57
Cincotti, S. and M. Raberto (2005). “Modeling and simulation of a double
auction artificial financial market”. In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and
its Applications 355.1, pp. 34–45.
Colander, D., H. Follmer, A. Haas, M. Goldberg, K. Juselius, A. Kirman, T.
Lux, and B. Sloth (2009). “The Financial Crisis and the Systemic Failure
of the Economics Profession”. In: Critical Review 21.2, pp. 249–267.
Cont, R. (2001). “Empirical properties of asset returns: stylized facts and
statistical issues”. In: Quantitative Finance 1, pp. 223–236.
Cooper, G. (2008). The Origin of Financial Crises: Central banks, credit bubbles
and the efficient market fallacy. Harriman House Publishing.
Crutchfield, J. P. (1994). “The calculi of emergence: computation, dynamics
and induction”. In: Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena 75.1–3, pp. 11–54.
Cutler, D., J. Poterba, and L. Summers (1989). “What moves stock prices?”
In: Journal of Portfolio Management 15, pp. 4–12.
Dawid, H. (1999). Adaptive Learning by Genetic Algorithms. Springer.
Debreu, G. (1974). “Excess Demand Functions”. In: Journal of Mathematical
Economics 1, pp. 15–23.
Delli Gatti, D., C. Di Guilmi, M. Gallegati, and G. Giulioni (2007). “Finan-
cial Fragility, Industrial Dynamics and Business Fluctuations in an Agent
Based Model”. In:Macroeconomic Dynamics 11.s1, pp. 62–79.
DeLong, J. B., A. Shleifer, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Waldmann (1990a).
“Noise trader risk in financial markets”. In: Journal of Political Economy
98, pp. 703–738.
DeLong, J. B., A. Shleifer, L. H. Summers, andR. J.Waldmann (1990b). “Pos-
itive feedback investment strategies and destabilizing rational specula-
tion”. In: Journal of Finance 45, pp. 379–395.
Ding, Z., C.W. J. Granger, and R. F. Engle (1993). “A longmemory property
of stock market returns and a newmodel”. In: Journal of Empirical Finance
1, pp. 83–106.
58
Dosi, G., G. Fagiolo, M. Napoletano, A. Roventini, and T. Treibich (2014).
“Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Complex Evolving Economies”. LEM
Working Paper 2014/07.
Fama, E. F. (1970). “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Em-
pirical Work”. In: The Journal of Finance 25.2, pp. 383–417.
Fama, E. F. (1991). “Efficient Capital Markets: II”. In: The Journal of Finance
46.5, pp. 1575–1617.
Fisher, I. (1933). “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”. In:
Econometrica 1.4, pp. 337–357111.
Flake, G. W. (1998). The Computational Beauty of Nature: Computer Explo-
rations of Fractals, Chaos, Complex Systems, and Adaptation. The MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Flood, M. D. (1991). “An Introduction to Complete Markets”. In: Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis Review 73.2, pp. 32–57.
Focardi, S. M., S. Cincotti, andM.Marchesi (2002). “Self-organization and
market crashes”. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 49.2,
pp. 241–267.
Franke, R. and F.Westerhoff (2012). “Structural stochastic volatility in asset
pricing dynamics: Estimation and model contest”. In: Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 36.8, pp. 1193–1211.
Frankel, J. A. and K. A. Froot (1986). “Understanding the US dollar in the
eighties: the expectations of chartists and fundamentalists”. In: Economic
Record 1.2, pp. 24–38.
Frankel, J. A. and K. A. Froot (1987a). “Using survey data to test stan-
dard propositions regarding exchange rate expectations”. In: American
Economic Review 77, pp. 133–153.
Frankel, J. A. and K. A. Froot (1987b). “Short-term and long-term expec-
tations of the yen/dollar exchange rate: evidence from survey data”. In:
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 1, pp. 249–274.
59
Frankel, J. A. and K. A. Froot (1990a). “Chartists, fundamentalists and the
demand for dollars”. In: Private behaviour and government policy in interde-
pendent economies. Ed. by A. S. Courakis and M. P. Taylor. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York.
Frankel, J. A. and K. A. Froot (1990b). “The rationality of the foreign ex-
change rate. Chartists, fundamentalists and trading in the foreign ex-
change market”. In: American Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceed-
ings 80.2, pp. 181–185.
Froot, K. A. and E. M. Dabora (1999). “How are stock prices affected by the
location of trade?” In: Journal of Financial Economics 53.2, pp. 189–216.
Gaunesdorfer, A. (2000). “Endogenous fluctuations in a simple asset pric-
ing model with heterogeneous agents”. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 24, pp. 799–831.
Gaunesdorfer, A. and C. Hommes (2000). “A nonlinear structural model for
volatility clustering”. CeNDEF Working Paper.
Grandmont, J. M. (1985). “On Endogenous Competitive Business Cycles”.
In: Econometrica 53.5, pp. 995–1045.
Guillaume, D. M., M. M. Dacorogna, R. R. Davé, U. A. Müller, R. B. Olsen,
and O. V. Pictet (1997). “From the bird’s eye to the microscope: A survey
of new stylized facts of the intra-daily foreign exchange markets”. In: Fi-
nance and Stochastics 1.2, pp. 95–129.
Hendry, D. F. and G. E. Mizon (2014). “Unpredictability in economic anal-
ysis, econometric modeling and forecasting”. In: Journal of Econometrics
182.1, pp. 186–195.
Holland, J. H. (2006). “Studying Complex Adaptive Systems”. In: Journal
of Systems Science and Complexity 19.1, pp. 1–8.
Hommes, C. (2006). “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Fi-
nance”. In: Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume 2. Ed. by L. Tes-
fatsion and K. Judd. North Holland.
60
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk”. In: Econometrica 47.2, pp. 263–291.
Kindleberger, C. P. (1978).Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial
Crises. Basic Books.
Kirman, A. P. (1992). “Whom or What does the Representative Agent rep-
resent?” In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 6.2, pp. 117–136.
Kirman, A. P. (2011). Complex Economics: Individual and Collective Rationality.
Routledge.
Kirman, A. P., R. Ricciotti, and R. Topol (2007). “Bubbles in the foreign
exchange market: it takes two to tango”. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics 11,
pp. 102–123.
Kyle (1985). “Continuous auctions and insider trading”. In: Econometric 47,
pp. 1315–1336.
Lane, D. A. (1993). “Artificial worlds and economics, part I”. In: Journal of
Evolutionary Economics 3.2, pp. 89–107.
LeBaron, B. (2006). “Agent-Based Computational Finance”. In: Handbook
of Computational Economics, Volume 2. Ed. by L. Tesfatsion and K. Judd.
North Holland.
LeBaron, B., W. B. Arthur, and R. G Palmer (1999). “Time series properties
of an artificial stock market”. In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
23.9–10, pp. 1487–1516.
LeRoy, S. F. and R. D. Porter (1981). “The present value relation: Tests based
on implied variance bounds”. In: Econometrica 49, pp. 555–574.
Levy, H. (1994). “Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion: An Experimental
Study”. In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8, pp. 289–307.
Levy, M. and H. Levy (1996). “The Danger of Assuming Homogeneous Ex-
pectations”. In: Financial Analysts Journal 52.3, pp. 65–70.
61
Levy, M., H. Levy, and S. Solomon (1994). “A Microscopic Model of the
Stock Market: Cycles, Booms, and Crashes”. In: Economics Letters 45.1,
pp. 103–111.
Levy, M., H. Levy, and S. Solomon (1995). “Simulation of the Stock Mar-
ket: The Effects of Microscopic Diversity”. In: Journal de Physique I 5.8,
pp. 1087–1107.
Levy, M., H. Levy, and S. Solomon (2000).Microscopic Simulation of Financial
Markets. Academic Press, London.
Levy, M., N. Persky, and S. Solomon (1996). “The Complex Dynamics of a
Simple Stock Market Model”. In: International Journal of High Speed Com-
puting 8.93, pp. 93–119.
Lucas Jr., R. E. (1971). “Econometric testing of the natural rate hypothesis”.
In: The Econometrics of Price Determination Conference. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and Social Science Research Council.
Lucas Jr., R. E. (1976). “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique”. In:
The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy 1. Ed. by K. Brunner and A. Meltzer. American Elsevier.
Lux, T. (1995). “Herd behaviour, bubbles and crashes”. In: Economic Journal
105, pp. 881–896.
Lux, T. andM.Marchesi (1999). “Scaling and criticality in a stochasticmulti-
agent model of a financial market”. In: Nature 397.11, pp. 498–500.
Lux, T. and M. Marchesi (2001). “Volatility clustering in financial markets:
A micro-simulation of interacting agents”. In: Journal of Theoretical and
Applied Finance 3, pp. 675–702.
Mandelbrot, B. (1963). “The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices”. In:
Journal of Business 36.4, pp. 394–419.
Mantel, R. (1976). “Homothetic Preferences and Community Excess De-
mand Functions”. In: Journal of Economic Theory 12, pp. 197–201.
62
Marchesi, M., S. Cincotti, S. M. Focardi, and M. Raberto (2003). “The
Genoa artificial stock market: microstructure and simulation”. In: Lecture
notes in economics and mathematical systems 521, pp. 277–289.
Marengo, L. and H. Tordjman (1996). “Speculation, Heterogeneity and
Learning: Amodel of Exchange Rate Dynamics”. In: Kyklos 49.3, pp. 407–
438.
Merton, R. C. (1973). “Theory of Rational Option Pricing”. In: The Bell Jour-
nal of Economics and Management Science 4.1, pp. 141–183.
Milgrom, P. and N. Stokey (1982). “Information, trade and common knowl-
edge”. In: Journal of Economic Theory 26, pp. 17–27.
Minsky, H. P. (1986). Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. McGraw Hill.
Minsky, H. P. (1992). “The Financial Instability Hypothesis”. The Jerome
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper 74.
Muth, J. S. (1961). “Rational expectations and the theory of price move-
ments”. In: Econometrica 29, pp. 315–335.
Nelson, R. R. and S. Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Palmer, R. G., W. B. Arthur, J. H. Holland, B. LeBaron, and P. Tayler
(1994). “Artificial Economic Life: a Simple Model of a Stockmarket”. In:
Physica D 75, pp. 264–274.
Pindyck, R. S. and J. Rotemberg (1993). “The Comovement of Stock Prices”.
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 108.4, pp. 1073–1104.
Raberto,M., S. Cincotti, S.M. Focardi, andM.Marchesi (2003b). “Traders’
Long-Run Wealth in an Artificial Financial Market”. In: Computational
Economics 22.2, pp. 255–272.
Ribeiro, R. and P. Veronesi (2002). The Excess Comovement of International
Stock Markets in Bad Times: A Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model.
Mimeo.
63
Rieck, C. (1994). “Evolutionary Simulation of asset Trading Strategies”. In:
Many-Agent Simulation and Artificial Life. Ed. by E. Hillenbrand and J.
Stender. IOS Press.
Rosser Jr., J. B. (2000). FromCatastrophe to Chaos: AGeneral Theory of Economic
Discontinuities (Volume I). Springer.
Roubini, N. (2006). “Why Central Banks Should Burst Bubbles”. In: Interna-
tional Finance 9.1, pp. 87–107.
Sargent, T. (1993). Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics. Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Schiff, P. D. and J. Downes (2007).Crash Proof: How to Profit from the Economic
Collapse. Wiley.
Shiller, R. J. (1981). “Do stock prices move too much to be justified by sub-
sequent changes in dividends?” In:American Economic Review 71, pp. 421–
436.
Shiller, R. J. (1984). “Stock prices and social dynamics”. In: Brookings Papers
in Economic Activity 2, pp. 457–510.
Shiller, R. J. (1989).Market Volatility. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Simon, H. A. (1957).Models of Man. Wiley, New York.
Sonnenschein, H. (1972). “Market Excess Demand Functions”. In: Econo-
metrica 40, pp. 549–563.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1990). “Symposium on Bubbles”. In: Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 4.2, pp. 13–18.
Tesfatsion, L. (2003). “Agent-Based Computational Economics: Modelling
Economies as Complex Adaptive Systems”. In: Information Sciences 149,
pp. 263–269.
Tesfatsion, L. (2006). “Agent-Based Computational Economics: a construc-
tive approach to Economic Theory”. In: Handbook of Computational Eco-
nomics, Volume 2. Ed. by L. Tesfatsion and K. Judd. North Holland.
64
Tesfatsion, L. and K. L. Judd (2006). Handbook of Computational Economics,
Volume 2. North Holland.
Westerhoff, F. (2009). “A simple agent-based financial market model: Di-
rect interactions and comparisons of trading profits”. BERGWorking Pa-
per Series, No. 61.
Westerhoff, F. and R. Franke (2012a). “Converse trading strategies, intrin-
sic noise and the stylized facts of financial markets”. In: Quantitative Fi-
nance 12.3, pp. 425–436.
Zeeman, E. C. (1974). “The unstable behavior of stock exchange”. In: Journal
of Mathematical Economics 1, pp. 39–49.
Zschischang, E. and T. Lux (2001). “Some new results on the Levy, Levy
and Solomon microscopic stock market model”. In: Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications 291.1–4, pp. 563–573.
65
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Once the individual wealth evolution is defined in
equation (5.5), aggregate wealth holds:
Wt = Wt 1 
"
x0t 1  (1+ r f ) +
L
å
`=1
x`n,t 1 
 
p`t
p`t 1
+ e`t
!#
(A.1)
Substituting (A.1) into pricing equation (5.10) yields
p`t
p`t 1
=
x`t Wt
x`t 1 Wt 1
=
x`t
x`t 1

"
x0t 1  (1+ r f ) +
L
å
`=1
x`n,t 1 
 
p`t
p`t 1
+ e`t
!#
(A.2)
where asset prices still appear in both LHS and RHS. If we multiply both
sides by x`t 1 and sum over `, we get
L
å
`=1
x`t 1 
p`t
p`t 1
=
L
å
`=1
x`t 
"
x0t 1  (1+ r f ) +
L
å
`=1
x`n,t 1 
 
p`t
p`t 1
+ e`t
!#
(A.3)
We are now able to compute the LHS in terms of known quantities:
L
å
`=1
x`t 1 
p`t
p`t 1
=
1  x0t
x0t

"
x0t 1  (1+ r f ) +
L
å
`=1
x`n,t 1  e`t
#
(A.4)
Substituting (A.4) into (A.1) yields the implied evolution of aggregate
wealth
Wt = Wt 1 
x0t 1  (1+ r f ) +åL`=1 x`n,t 1  e`t
x0t
(A.5)
the knowledge of which, alongwith (5.10) yields the equilibrium prevailing
price:
p`t = p
`
t 1 
x`t
x`t 1
 x
0
t 1  (1+ r f ) +åL`=1 x`n,t 1  e`t
x0t
(A.6)
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The LHS is clearly strictly positive if
x`t > 0 8` = 0, . . . , L, 8t (A.7)
or, equivalently, if
x`n,t 2 (0, 1) 8n = 0, . . . ,N, 8` = 0, . . . , L, 8t (A.8)
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